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1 Introductory Remarks
Racial classiications sort humans into racial 
groupings regardless of their consent. hese groupings 
tend to be hierarchical, with each group’s members 
experiencing distinctive harms and beneits by virtue 
of their group’s position in the hierarchy (see Magee 
and Galinsky; Bashi and McDaniel 671; Bashi 966; 
Conley; Mills; Vogel). Here we ask: What is it to be 
racialized as a human being? What is it, for example, to 
be white, black, Asian, or Hispanic in the United States 
of America? Or to be branco, pardo, preto, amarilo, 
indígina in Brazil (Santos et al)?
Our question is not whether race is real or 
illusory, or whether biological, social, or agential 
factors ground racial hierarchies. We leave such issues 
to metaphysicians. Nor is our question about how 
racial classiications afect those in diferent positions 
within a racial hierarchy. We leave this to sociologists. 
Our question, rather, concerns how to understand the 
interconnectedness of a person’s humanness and their 
race. We ask this question amidst a surge of interest for 
theorizing race as some sort of technology. Consider 
four examples. Falguni Sheth, a political philosopher, 
interprets race as a technology that legitimates violence 
and exclusion while concealing its nature and function. 
Wendy Chun, a media theorist, interprets race as a 
technology that positions whites as human and Asians 
as robotic. Beth Coleman, a comparative literary 
theorist, interprets race as a technology that extends 
our capacity for autonomous agency. Ruha Benjamin, a 
sociologist, interprets race as a technology for creating 
and maintaining inequality (“Innovating Inequality”).
Our essay focuses on posthumanist approaches 
to theorizing race as technology. hese approaches 
understand racialized humans as posthuman, 
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fundamentally distinct from mere humans. his might 
seem to be a natural approach to theorizing race as 
technology, insofar as technology carries connotations 
of allowing (or tempting) us to transcend human 
limitations. But this posthumanist approach has 
received relatively scant attention, because posthumanist 
paradigms tend to bypass “a more comprehensive 
examination of the role of race in “the human’s’ 
metaphysics” (Jackson, “Outer Worlds” 216). here are 
worries, moreover, that posthumanist approaches to 
race are “persistent bourgeois attempt[s] to reduce the 
most human problems to comfortable, hollow notions” 
(Césaire 62; also see Jackson, “Animal” 672).
We aim to explore these worries by engaging 
with a posthumanist interpretation of cyborgs. Cyborg 
theorizing has tended to evade issues of race (Wilkinson 
170; see also Schueller 77-82), but this is changing. 
Recent scholarship by both Jasbir Puar and Margaret 
Rhee, for example, invokes the notion of cyborg in 
eforts to better integrate posthuman theorizing with 
theories about racial classiication and hierarchy. 
Puar interprets race as cyborg technology for its 
potential to avoid privileging bodies as human. Rhee, 
extending Puar’s interpretation, invokes the cyborg as 
exemplifying the way race reconigures what she calls 
our “agentic activities.”
We argue that the posthumanist interpretation of 
racialized humans as cyborgs, despite its several virtues, 
does not properly accommodate the empirical realities 
of race. he concept of the cyborg has rich conceptual 
associations, many of which align with aspects of race 
that tend to be ignored or under-theorized. But, in our 
view, theorizing racialized humans as cyborgs inhibits 
properly understanding the diverse ways in which social 
contexts—conditions external to and separable from 
human bodies—create and sustain racial classiications 
and hierarchies.
We advocate an alternative, humanist interpretation 
of racial hierarchies as industrial technologies. his 
facilitates understanding how social contexts constitute 
and create conditions in which human organisms 
live and move and have their being. It supports an 
alternative explanation for how race reconigures our 
agentic activities: not, as with cyborgs, because race 
is an inexplicable part of our identities, but because 
human industrial institutions and infrastructures shape 
the impacts and available use-functions of race as a 
technology. It also gestures toward correlations, and 
potential connections, between industrial revolutions 
and modern racial hierarchies.
We locate our analysis in the context of race as it 
has developed in the United States of America. Much 
of the philosophical and scientiic scholarship with 
which we are familiar focuses on this context, and we 
ofer references as guides for exploring that context. We 
suspect that our analysis extends to other contexts, but 
we leave this work for another occasion. We intend our 
argument as contributing a partial remedy to “the lack 
of suitable critical schemes to scrutinize the present” 
(Braidotti, Posthuman 4).
2 Posthuman Promises
he notion of human as sovereign and autonomous 
consciousness its poorly with lived human experiences. 
Environmental factors, both social and natural, 
inluence our minds in subtle and unconscious ways. 
Our bodies are diverse, and corporeal diference oten 
tracks diferences of agential capacity—for example, 
male bodies command kinds of power and respect 
unavailable, or available only at great cost, to female 
ones. Posthumanism infers from this mismatch that 
we ought to understand ourselves as posthuman rather 
than human.
N. Katherine Hayles understands the notion 
of posthuman as a cluster concept. he posthuman, 
according to Hayles, prioritizes informational exchange 
over corporeal biology, consciousness as epiphenomenal 
rather than agential, bodies as technological prosthesis 
rather than privileged locus of behavior, and human 
beings as continuous with artiicial and cybernetic 
forms of life (2-3). Hayles contrasts the posthuman, so 
understood, with a notion of human prevalent from early 
modern European philosophy: a mind who naturally 
owns its corporeal body, who uses consciousness to 
enact its will and control its bodily behaviors, and who 
stands apart from others—animal and machine alike—
by virtue of its capacity for autonomous action (3).
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 Braidotti ofers a similar contrast. he human, for 
Braidotti, has an inexhaustible capacity for authenticity 
and self-realization, a consciousness capable of 
transcending spatiotemporal particularities and 
geographical boundaries in order to access timeless 
and universal truths, and a rational mind that controls 
the body while imposing meaning and value upon the 
world (Posthuman 13-22). he posthuman, by contrast, 
is complex and relational rather than unitary and self-
suicient; afective and embodied rather than rational 
and incorporeal; multiply fragmented and local rather 
than coherently uniied and universal (Braidotti, 
Posthuman 26-28).
Despite these similar conceptualizations, there 
is something about the posthuman that resists 
categorization. Braidotti hints at the source of resistance:
Not being framed by the ineluctable 
powers of signiication, [the posthuman] is 
consequently not condemned to seek adequate 
representation of its existence within a system 
that is constitutionally incapable of granting 
due recognition. (Posthuman 188)
hweatt-Bates makes a similar observation, 
characterizing the notion of posthuman as
a way of naming the unknown, possible, 
(perhaps) future, altered identity of human 
beings, as we incorporate various technologies 
into our bodies and selves. It therefore 
functions as an umbrella term, covering a 
span of related concepts: genetically enhanced 
persons, artiicial persons or androids, 
uploaded consciousnesses, cyborgs and 
chimeras (mechanical or genetic hybrids). (1)
Accordingly, while the posthuman difers from the 
human, these diferences do not exhaust the meaning of 
posthuman. he posthuman is fundamentally inefable, 
resisting the ixity of conceptualization, unconined by 
well-deined categories, open to unconceived futures 
incommensurable with the present (also see Hayles 
283-287; Ferrando 30).
Simultaneous with its inefability, the posthuman 
seems to ofer a framework for making sense of our 
social condition—full of inequality, negativity, and 
oppression of many sorts—and imagining better 
futures. here is an overwhelming body of empirical 
evidence about the harmful impacts of racial hierarchies 
upon members of oppressed races (Song). here is also 
a growing social desire—well represented by the Black 
Lives Matter and We Are Here movements in the United 
States—for ameliorating or preventing those harms (see 
Edwards and Harris). So we should expect the notion 
of posthuman to facilitate insightful theorizing about 
racial hierarchies—their grounds, their impacts, and 
efective strategies for reformation and transformation 
toward racial justice.
3 Against Cyborgs
3.1 Posthuman Identity as Cyborg Identity
 Of the many visions available for theorizing within 
a posthumanist orientation, the cyborg ranks among 
the most inluential and suggestive (see Braidotti, 
“Posthuman;” hweatt-Bates 5; Ferrando 28; Kull 51). 
he vision of the cyborg originates with Donna Haraway, 
who characterizes it as “a kind of disassembled and 
reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self ” 
(163). hat is, according to Haraway, the cyborg is “a 
cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, 
a creature of social reality as well as a creature of iction” 
(149). Cyborgs are hybrids, because their machinic 
and organismal components are inseparable, neither 
capable of existing as it is apart from the other. hese 
hybrids are creatures of social reality, because existing 
networks of social relations prioritize some syntheses 
over others, and because diferent hybridizations live 
diferent social experiences. But cyborgs are creatures 
of iction, too, by virtue of existing as social and political 
constructions, so that diferent constructions ground 
alternative hybrid potentials.
Braidotti classiies Haraway’s vision of cyborgs 
as “high-post-humanism,” subject to the caveats that 
Haraway herself disavows the posthumanist label and 
that Haraway understands her work on companion 
species as subsuming earlier work on cyborgs 
(Braidotti, “Posthuman” 197-198). But whether cyborgs 
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ofer a vision of the posthuman is quite independent 
of Haraway’s intellectual preferences. For the notion of 
cyborg lends itself to posthuman theorizing (see Kull 
51). Cyborg anthropology, for example, argues that
human subjects and subjectivity are crucially 
as much a function of machines, machine 
relations, and information transfers as they are 
machine producers and operators. (Downey, 
Dumit, and Williams 266)
Chela Sandoval sketches how to realize the 
theoretical promise of the cyborg concept in the 
context of racial oppression. She argues that oppressed 
races enact five methodologies for achieving 
autonomy within harmful racial hierarchies: reading 
cultural signs, challenging signs from dominant 
ideologies by separating sign from intended meaning, 
appropriating those signs by investing them with 
new meaning, orienting such deconstructive efforts 
toward building egalitarian social relations, and 
selecting appropriate behaviors to enact those efforts 
(Sandoval 376). Sandoval proposes that because 
cyborgs also challenge conventional meanings, by 
virtue of expanding human capacities, we can better 
understand how these methodologies, employed 
by racialized humans, work by theorizing them as 
enacted by cyborgs (Sandoval 381-383).
Neil Harbisson’s Eyeborg illustrates the spirit of 
Sandoval’s analysis, albeit without the racial context. 
Born only with the capacity to see black and white, 
Harbisson wears a device—an Eyeborg—that converts 
colors into sounds. Over time, the Eyeborg has altered 
his neural pathways, giving him new capacities for 
visualizing the world (see Alfaro et al). Harbisson can 
“read” visual signs, but his unconventional readings 
allow him to invest common activities with new 
meaning. For instance, he can compose music by 
“viewing” mosaics, and he paints voice performances 
(Pearlman). Harbisson’s cyborg capacity for hearing 
colors thereby challenges conventional separations of 
sound and vision, outside of which he had previously 
been positioned. Similarly, Sandoval’s proposal to 
categorize the methodologies enacted by oppressed 
races as cyborg technologies would seem to suggest that 
eforts to challenge harmful racial hierarchies are best 
understood as cyborg, rather than human, activities.
3.2 heorizing Racialized Humans as 
Cyborgs
Haraway’s vision of the cyborg is designed to 
subvert “the tradition of racist, male-dominant 
capitalism” by destabilizing borders between self 
and other, autonomous organism and deterministic 
machine (Haraway 150). Haraway contends that,
Gender, race, or class consciousness is an 
achievement forced on us by the terrible 
historical experience of the contradictory 
social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and 
capitalism. (155)
hese contradictory realities limit phenomenological 
possibility. For example, when colonial ideology reserves 
personhood for whites to the exclusion of blacks, while 
patriarchal ideology reserves personhood for men to the 
exclusion of women, black women inherit only “a cascade 
of negative identities,” ignored not only by feminists 
combating patriarchy but also by anti-imperialists 
resisting colonialism (Haraway 156).
he vision of black women as cyborgs avoids this 
cascade of negativities. As a cyborg identity, “woman of 
color” is “a potent subjectivity synthesized from fusions 
of outsider identities” (Haraway 174). Black women 
thereby gain positive identity as hybrid integrations of 
human organism, on the one hand, and the dual social 
constructions of “woman” and “black,” on the other. hese 
cyborgs derive power from their existence on the margins 
of patriarchal and colonialist ideologies (Haraway 176). 
his power makes them capable of surviving and thriving 
by virtue of seizing as their own the stories, language, and 
tools used to mark them as other or erase them from view 
(Haraway 175-176). In doing so, black women as cyborgs 
problematize “the statuses of man or woman, human, 
artefact, member of a race, individual entity, or body” 
(Haraway 178). hey thereby undermine fundamental 
supports for gender and racial injustice.
Such, in rough outline, is the signiicance for racial 
justice and activism of envisioning the posthuman 
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as cyborg. Whence Haraway’s remark that “Cyborg 
imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms 
in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to 
ourselves” (181).
We acknowledge that envisioning racialized 
humans as cyborgs stimulates creative exploration of 
alternative social and political possibilities. We note, 
further, the power of that vision to explain lived realities 
of racialized humans. For example, theorizing people 
of color as cyborgs helps to explain their unequal or 
oppressive treatment, because cyborgs themselves are 
oten de-humanized, treated as less than fully human, 
or conceptualized as threats to established social order. 
Similarly, theorizing race as a fundamental component 
of cyborg identity helps to explain why racial 
colorblindness is a myth: because the fundamental 
components of cyborg identities are inseparable, a 
person apart from their race cannot exist as the same 
person (see Neville, Gallardo, and Sue).
3.3 Passing and Stationarity
Despite these several theoretical virtues, however, 
theorizing racialized humans as cyborgs does not 
match the empirical reality of race—at least, not 
without signiicant ad hoc adjustments. We consider 
two phenomena in particular: passing and stationarity 
(see also Mallon).
Consider, irst, the phenomenon of passing, 
wherein a member of one racial group allows or 
encourages their classiication by others as a member 
of another racial group (Ginsberg; Kennedy; Kroeger). 
In Philip Roth’s he Human Stain, for example, the 
character Coleman Silk, despite being raised as black in 
a black family, passes as Jewish and therefore as white. 
Because racial passing gives members of oppressed 
racial groups access to social status and power reserved 
for members of privileged races, it has the capacity to 
subvert or transform harmful racial hierarchies
Consider, next, the phenomenon of stationarity, 
wherein membership in a racial group does not travel 
beyond relatively local spatiotemporal borders. Michael 
Root ofers a vivid example of this phenomenon:
 
Some men who are black in New Orleans now 
would have been octoroons there some years ago 
or would have been white in Brazil today. Socrates 
had no race in ancient Athens, though he would 
be a white man in Minnesota. (631-632)
Because racial membership is stationary, traveling 
gives members of oppressed racial groups potential 
access to kinds of social status and power reserved 
for members of privileged races. Hence, like passing, 
traveling has the potential to subvert or transform 
harmful racial hierarchies.
Insofar as cyborg identities carry subversive 
capacities similar to those available through racial 
passing and travel, one would expect the vision of 
racialized humans as cyborgs to accommodate the 
phenomena of passing and stationarity. But it does not. 
Changing a cyborg’s technology changes its biology. 
But those who change their race through passing or 
traveling do not change their biology. So race is not a 
cyborg technology. 
Cyborgs are hybrids of organismal biology 
and machinic construction. his means that their 
machinic and biological components are inseparable, 
neither capable of existing as it is without the other. 
For example, Neil Harbisson with Eyeborg has 
fundamentally diferent neural pathways than Neil 
Harbisson without Eyeborg, and Eyeborg only functions 
when properly wired to active neural pathways. By 
analogy, this would mean that if Coleman Silk’s early 
identity as a black man is a cyborg identity, Silk with his 
blackness has fundamentally diferent biology than Silk 
without blackness. Hence, if we theorize race as cyborg 
technology, it follows that when Coleman Silk shits 
to white—by passing as Jewish—he would thereby 
change his biology. But this is not how racial passing 
works. Silk’s passing as white leaves his biology intact. 
Similarly, if a New Orleanian’s identity as a black man 
in New Orleans is a cyborg identity, the man with his 
blackness has fundamentally diferent biology than the 
man without it. Hence, if we theorize race as cyborg 
technology, it follows that when the New Orleanian 
travels to Brazil—and becomes white—he would change 
his biology. But this is not how racial stationarity works. 
he New Orleanian’s journey to Brazil leaves his biology 
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intact. When Silk and the New Orleanian pass and 
travel, respectively, their racial classiications change, 
not because of changes to their persons, but because of 
changes to the social conditions that give meaning and 
function to their biology. Race, in these cases, is more 
akin to CDMA technology in mobile phones, ofering 
lower functionality in some contexts (Brazil) than in 
others (United States) despite persisting as the same 
hardware across those contexts.
One might object, on behalf of the cyborg vision, 
that nothing prevents understanding cyborgs as having 
chameleon identities, undergoing sudden transmutation 
when passing or traveling. hese innovations open the 
conceptual possibility that the racial components for 
some cyborg identities are Janus-faced, now rendering 
the cyborg a member of one race, soon ater another. 
We reply that preserving the cyborg vision in this 
way is ad hoc. Nothing requires understanding cyborgs 
as having chameleon identities. his is also not how 
cyborgs work. When Neil Harbisson leaves his home 
community, others continue seeing his Eyeborg—that 
is, Harbisson as cyborg—even were he to somehow 
“turn of ” the device. Moreover, were Harbisson to 
remove his Eyeborg, he would no longer be a cyborg 
even though, arguably, his neural pathways would 
likely take some time to reconigure ater losing the 
ability to hear colors. Chameleon transformations, by 
contrast, are more sudden, on the order of seconds 
rather than weeks (or longer). Coleman Silk and the 
New Orleanian become white the moment they enter 
a diferent racial network.
But more importantly, conceptualizing some 
cyborgs as chameleons undermines the power of 
the cyborg vision. It is the inseparable hybridity of 
organism and machine that gives cyborgs their positive 
identities and that is said to undermine a range of 
dualisms essential to patriarchal and colonial ideologies. 
Moreover, such theorizing shoulders the concept of 
the chameleon with the weight for explaining the 
phenomena of racial passing and stationarity. his casts 
doubt upon the theoretical value of the cyborg concept, 
because non-cyborgs (such as actual chameleons) also 
possess chameleon identities.
4 On Racial Classiication as Prosthetic 
Technology
he minimal alteration of the cyborg vision 
capable of accommodating the phenomena of racial 
passing and stationarity involves theorizing race as 
a prosthetic technology (Coleman; Gill-Peterson). 
So understood, racialized humans consist of racial 
classiications coupled to originary bodies. Because the 
coupling is prosthetic, racial classiication is separable 
from biological body. For the subjects of prosthetics 
preserve their bodies intact upon removal or alteration 
of their prosthetic. Race, so theorized, is more akin to 
a cane or an artiicial leg, extending human capacities 
without altering human biology.
Envisioning race as a prosthetic technology 
accommodates the phenomena of passing and 
stationarity. Both may be understood to involve 
switching prostheses. Because prostheses are separable 
from their subjects, however, neither passing nor 
traveling, so understood, require saying that racial 
passing and travel involve biological change. here is a 
danger in so accommodating these racial phenomena, 
however. We tend to understand the bodies of those who 
wear prosthetics as lacking that which the prosthetic 
provides, as when we say, of an amputee with prosthetic 
legs, that her body lacks legs. By analogy, if racial 
classiications are prosthetics, it seems that we should 
understand the bodily subjects of those prosthetics—
that is, human bodies—as unraced, retaining a pre-
prosthetic state that lacks race and thereby exists 
prior to racial grouping. he danger here is one of 
succumbing to, or perhaps reinforcing, the myth of 
racial colorblindness. 
Julian Gill-Peterson avoids this danger by 
insisting that posthumanism is the proper framework 
for theorizing race as prosthetic technology (409). 
According to Gill-Peterson, the posthuman, unlike 
the human, is always and already racialized, and 
universal “unraced” bodies are de facto white bodies 
(409). He thereby follows Beth Coleman in imagining 
racial classiication, not as a technology that mars 
an otherwise pristine and pure subject, but as one 
that “adds functionality to the subject, helps form 
45Ilha do Desterro v. 70, nº 2, p. 039-051, Florianópolis, mai/ago 2017
location, and provides information” (Coleman 194). 
Understood as posthuman subjects, originary bodies 
are not unraced because they always already have racial 
identities of some sort. heorizing racialized humans 
as contingent and relatively stable alliances between 
posthuman bodies and prosthetic racial classiications 
thereby secures the several theoretical virtues of the 
cyborg vision while avoiding its empirical inadequacy. 
We have no decisive objection to this approach for 
understanding race. But we ind ourselves discontent 
nonetheless.
Our concern is twofold. On the one hand, 
theorizing racial classiication as a prosthetic 
technology does too much. Prosthetics are sources 
of functionality, and subjects bear responsibility for 
enacting those functions. For example, an amputee’s 
prosthetic leg is the source of her power to walk, and the 
amputee is responsible not only for harms the artiicial 
leg might inlict upon others but also for harms she 
risks to her body by virtue of using the prosthetic. By 
analogy, if race is a prosthetic technology, members of 
oppressed races bear responsibility for the harms and 
beneits associated with their racial classiications. his 
consequence strikes us as morally unacceptable and 
politically naïve.
On the other hand, theorizing race as a prosthetic 
technology does too little. It ofers too few resources 
for explaining the harms of racial oppression. 
First, prosthetic technologies harm their users by 
virtue of intrinsic defect or improper usage. Racial 
classiications, by contrast, seem to harm their users for 
many more reasons. For example, social institutions 
such as apartheid and school segregation harm 
members of oppressed racial groups, but the harm does 
not occur by virtue of people in those groups misusing 
their race or because their race itself is intrinsically 
defective. Second, people tend to prefer prosthetics 
that enhance function, avoiding prosthetics that harm. 
So theorizing race as a prosthetic technology also fails 
to explain why racial passing is a rare phenomenon. 
Finally, people with prosthetics are typically able to 
separate from their prosthetics at-will: those who use 
a prosthetic have signiicant control over when and 
whether to wear the prosthetic. But membership in 
racial categories typically is not like this, and only a 
select few are capable of racial passing. 
5 Toward Racial Hierarchy as Industrial 
Technology
he posthumanist paradigm, as we understand it, 
rejects the notion of the human because it rejects the 
idea that humans are autonomous and self-suicient, 
capable of acting and existing independently of others. 
Posthumanism thereby blurs the boundaries between 
embodied subjects and their social contexts. he 
concepts of the cyborg and the prosthetic are natural 
concepts for developing this paradigm but, as we have 
argued, those concepts poorly accommodate various 
empirical phenomena associated with race. heorizing 
race within the posthumanist paradigm also strikes 
us somewhat perverse. For, as Lewis Gordon aptly 
observes, members of subordinate racial groups “have 
struggled too long for the humanist prize” (39). 
Accordingly, rather than search for a vision of the 
posthuman that strengthens or reines those of the 
cyborg hybrid and the prosthetic companion, we prefer 
to revisit and reine the notion of human. We propose, in 
particular, to theorize humans as inescapably dependent 
upon others for their identities and capacities despite 
also being distinct from those others. We theorize 
humans as depending upon others, because social 
institutions and infrastructures ground who we are 
and shape the choices available to us. We theorize this 
dependence as preserving distinction, because social 
institutions and infrastructures persist across changes 
in their human participants, and because humans 
are capable of moving to diferent social contexts 
without changing their bodies. We theorize that this 
dependence is also inescapable, because we maintain 
that humans are social animals. (We ind especially 
apt a saying in Chichewa, the language of Milawi: Kali 
kokha nkanyama. When you are on your own, you are 
as good as an animal of the wild.) 
Our notion of human preserves boundaries between 
embodied subjects and their social contexts. his allows 
us to interpret the social institutions that create and 
sustain racial hierarchies, and the infrastructures that 
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shape the diferential impacts of those hierarchies upon 
members of various racial groups, as factors that are 
distinct from racialized human bodies. Our notion of 
human also acknowledges the inescapable dependence 
of embodied subjects on their social contexts. his 
allows us to theorize human bodies as inescapably 
racialized by virtue of depending upon social factors 
that create, sustain, and shape the impacts of racial 
hierarchies. It also allows us to accommodate recent 
eforts to interpret race as something that legitimates 
violence, dehumanizes racial minorities, extends 
agential capacities, and creates inequality. We can do 
so by locating these functions of race in social factors 
that create, sustain, and shape the impacts of racial 
hierarchies. We leave to another occasion exploration 
of these applications for our notion of human. 
Our goal, for the remainder of this essay, 
is to develop a reined humanist framework for 
understanding the interconnectedness of a person’s 
humanness and their race. We ofer, as an alternative 
to posthumanist visions of cyborgs and prosthetics, a 
vision of race as an industrial technology. We develop 
this vision in three stages: irst, by explicating our 
notion of industrial technology; second, by interpreting 
some social factors upon which humans depend for 
their racial identities and capacities as components 
of an industrial technology; third, by explaining 
how our vision accommodates the phenomena of 
racial passing and stationarity. In theorizing race 
as an industrial technology, we are not considering 
the mutual production of race by technology and 
technology by race (Reardon). We are not focusing on 
interactions between technology and race, considered 
as separate things (Sinclair). Nor are we analogizing 
race as similar to industrial technology (Chun 8). 
Instead, we are subsuming racial hierarchy as a species 
in the family of industrial technologies, other species 
of which include automobiles and prosthetics. Our 
efort thereby resembles Teresa de Lauretis’ theorizing 
of gender as “the product and process of a number of 
social technologies, of techno-social or bio-medical 
apparati” (3). But we focus on industrial rather than 
social technology, and we focus on explication rather 
than application of theoretical framework.
5.1 Industrial Technology
We understand technology as any tool, amenable to 
deliberate and skillful use, which facilitates producing, 
transforming, or controlling something. Foucault 
distinguishes among four kinds of technology in this 
sense, with respect to the targets of tool use: sign-
system technologies, directed toward meaning and 
signiicance in our lives; production technologies, 
directed toward things; power technologies, directed 
toward other humans; and self technologies, directed 
toward ourselves (223-228). he National Academy of 
Engineering’s Committee on Technological Literacy 
likewise distinguishes among three kinds of technology, 
in our sense of the term, albeit with respect to tool 
sources: artifacts and tangible products; knowledge, 
processes, and techniques; and infrastructure (Pearson 
and Young 2-3). Tools not amenable to deliberate and 
skillful use, if such there be, are not technology in our 
sense. Nor are non-tools, such as Ellul’s techniques, 
which are merely standardized behavioral patterns 
(xxv-xxvi). We understand industrial technology, 
accordingly, as technology grounded upon some sort 
of industry, where by industry we mean to refer to any 
relatively self-contained community of people wherein 
subgroups of the community divide and coordinate 
their labor toward creating some good or service 
for large-scale distribution or consumption. (Trades 
and crats, by contrast, are not large-scale; and (free) 
markets lack coordination among divided labor.) 
We ind it useful to distinguish between the grounds 
and the conditions for industrial technologies. Grounds 
for an industrial technology are those factors by virtue of 
which the technology arises and persists. hese factors 
include techniques (standardized behavioral patterns), 
technicians (those who enact techniques), raw materials 
(the objects upon which technicians act), and machinic 
institutions (for coordinating technicians). Conditions 
for an industrial technology, by contrast, are those 
factors upon which the technology relies for realizing 
its distinctive functions, and which shape the impacts 
resulting from uses of the technology. hese factors 
include use-infrastructures, or those materials which 
make possible the efective use of technologies, as well 
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as social institutions, those organizational arrangements 
that structure relations among technology users.
Consider, as an illustrative example, the 
automobile. he automobile is a technology: it is a tool, 
subject to human control, that facilitates transporting 
people and goods from one location to another. here is 
also an automobile industry, involving manufacturers, 
distributors, and dealers, all of whom work together 
to distribute automobiles on a large scale. he grounds 
for automobiles include techniques for manufacturing, 
distributing, and selling automobiles; engineers, 
machinists, managers, and salespersons who enact 
those techniques; raw materials such as steel and 
rubber; and assembly lines that coordinate assembly 
workers (machinic institution). he conditions for 
automobiles, by contrast, include roads, gas stations, 
and oil supply lines (use-infrastructures) as well as laws 
and conventions for driving (social institutions).
5.2 Industrial Grounds and Conditions for 
Racial Hierarchy
In theorizing race as an industrial technology, we 
advocate understanding racial classiication and racial 
hierarchy as arising and persisting by virtue of grounds 
associated with industrial technologies, and as impacting 
members of various racial groups by virtue of conditions 
associated with those technologies. Consider, then, 
some of the industrial grounds for racial classiication 
and racial hierarchy. he raw materials for racialized 
humans might include evolved dispositions for thinking 
about ethnies (Machery and Faucher). hey almost 
certainly include human bodies. hese bodies, as we 
theorize them, are not race-neutral: there is no race-free 
body anymore than there are lines without lengths or 
shapes without colors. We thereby follow Gill-Peterson 
in understanding human bodies as always and already 
racialized. We do not follow him, however, in taking this 
to erase boundaries between humans’ bodies and their 
races, because we deny that necessary accompaniment 
requires blurring boundaries. We prefer, instead, to 
preserve conceptual distinctions—nominal though they 
might be—among human bodies and other grounds that 
sort those bodies into diferent racial groups. 
Other grounds for racialized humans include 
race-producing and sustaining technicians, such 
as hate groups, politicians and media personalities 
who facilitate or fuel racial animosities, and various 
other agents of state power such as police oicers. 
hese technicians use an array of race-producing and 
sustaining techniques (Haney-Lopez). Fields and Fields 
characterize these techniques as racecrat, factors that 
“govern what goes with what and whom (sumptuary 
codes), how diferent people must deal with each other 
(rituals of deference and dominance), where human 
kinship begins and ends (blood), and how [humans] … 
look at themselves and each other (the gaze)” (Fields 
and Fields 25, italics omitted). Race-technicians enact 
their race-crating techniques through an array of 
race-producing and sustaining machinic institutions: 
laws, such as the 13th and 15th Amendments during 
Reconstruction (Fields 163); social policies, such as 
the racial proiling guidelines and practices of law 
enforcement agents as endorsed by Terry v. Ohio (1968) 
and various political parties (Fields 164); and segregated 
markets, such as race-speciic medicine marketed to 
Latinx populations (Fields and Fields 49). 
Consider, next, some of the industrial conditions for 
racial hierarchy and classiication. Use-infrastructures 
include racial anxieties and fears, cultural knowledge 
of racial classiication categories that elicits diferential 
stereotyped responses to diferently racialized humans. 
hey also include continuing narratives of post-
racialism, which enable “civilized” racial oppression 
that is neither enshrined in law nor violent (Goldberg; 
Harvey). here are also social institutions with power 
to direct diferential impacts toward various racialized 
groups. For example, there are public laws that encode 
diferential privileges among racial group, as with Plessy 
v. Ferguson (1896). here are housing policies that 
enforce residential segregation by racial classiication, 
stop and frisk policies that disproportionately target 
members of oppressed racial groups, and computer-
generated metrics responsible for algorithmic racial 
discrimination (Benjamin, “Catching” 149-50). Further 
conditions include news and entertainment media, 
which publicize norms and expectations regarding 
diferential privilege among racial groups through 
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code words (Brooks and Hebert) or stereotypes and 
visuals (Mahtani); and “race corrections,” whether by 
manufacturers with respect to worker compensation 
policies or by judges with respect to interpretations 
of law, whereby impacts of otherwise race-neutral 
social policies are “adjusted” in response to the 
racial classiications of the subjects of those policies 
(Benjamin, “Catching” 147-148). 
5.3 Empirical Fit
We highlight only some of the grounds and 
conditions of racial hierarchy. Even these few factors, 
however, suice to show that theorizing racial hierarchy 
as industrial technology accommodates the phenomena 
of racial passing and stationarity.
Our theoretical framework explains racial passing 
at the level of industrial conditions: one who passes 
has their race by virtue of membership in a particular 
group in a racial hierarchy, and yet experiences impacts 
associated with membership in a diferent group by 
virtue of being subject to conditions associated with that 
diferent group. For example, insofar as Coleman Silk (in 
Roth’s novel he Human Stain) is a black man passing 
for white, he is black by virtue of race-producing and 
sustaining grounds making him so; but he receives the 
beneits of whiteness, and avoids the harms of blackness, 
by virtue of being subject to conditions associated 
with being Jewish. Such passing might involve, for 
instance, judges not “race correcting” legal penalties, or 
advertisers directing advertisement for “white people 
products” to his home address. It does not, however, 
involve changing his biology (as would be if he were 
theorized as a cyborg). he grounds that construct Silk 
as black remain the same, while the conditions that 
determine the impacts of his blackness change. 
Our theoretical framework explains racial 
stationarity, by contrast, at the level of industrial 
grounds. he technicians, machinery, and machinic 
institutions that ground racial hierarchies are localized 
to speciic times and geographical spaces. For example, 
the racial proiling guidelines and practices of law 
enforcement agents endorsed by Terry v. Ohio (1968) 
help to ground racial hierarchy in the United States 
but not in Brazil. So being black in New Orleans does 
not travel to being black in Brazil in part because the 
race-creating and sustaining laws that govern New 
Orleans do not travel to Brazil. And, more generally, 
race does not travel because many of its grounds do 
not travel. So, again, the New Orleanian’s traveling does 
not involve changing his biology. he raw materials 
for constructing his race remain the same, while the 
grounds that determine which race is constructed from 
that material change.
Our explanations of racial passing and stationarity 
point toward a deep diference between racial passing 
and racial traveling: racial passing is possible because 
conditions for racial impact do not always track 
grounds for racial groupings, while racial travel is 
possible because grounds for racial grouping are 
spatially and temporally localized. Diferent grounds 
construct products with diferent capacities, and 
diferent conditions for the same product facilitate 
diferent impacts upon using the same capacities. For 
example, the grounds for automobiles include their 
component parts. Working parts impact capacities for 
functional vehicles; defective parts, for dysfunctional 
ones. he conditions for automobiles, by contrast, 
include roads and various driving regulations. Well-
designed conditions facilitate safe vehicular operations; 
ill-designed conditions, dangerous ones, even for 
vehicles that are functional. By analogy, the grounds 
for racial hierarchy sort individuals into diferent racial 
groupings, some more privileged and empowered than 
others. he conditions for racial hierarchy, by contrast, 
facilitate how those privileges and powers (or lack 
thereof) are experienced by individuals so sorted.
6 Concluding Remarks
heorizing racial hierarchy as an industrial 
technology, and within a humanist framework, has 
several theoretical advantages to posthumanist cyborg- 
and prosthetic-approaches to understanding race. First, 
it accommodates the phenomena of racial passing and 
stationarity. It does so in a way that is principled rather 
than ad hoc. It also does so in a way that preserves 
relevant conceptual diferences between human 
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bodies and their races. For example, our theoretical 
framework explains a deep diference between racial 
passing and racial traveling: racial passing is possible 
because conditions for racial impact do not always 
track grounds for racial groupings, while racial travel 
is possible because grounds for racial grouping are 
spatially and temporally localized. Neither the cyborg 
nor prosthetic posthumanist theorizations of race ofer 
a similar explanation of such diference.
Second, theorizing racial hierarchy as an industrial 
technology provides a framework for organizing and 
integrating a wide array of research about race across a 
diverse range of disciplines. Our framework does this, 
in part, by virtue of distinguishing between grounds 
for racial hierarchies and conditions that facilitate the 
impacts of those hierarchies. It does so, as well, by virtue 
of identifying various distinct yet interrelated categories 
of ground and condition: technician, technique, raw 
material, and machinic institution in the case of 
grounds; use-infrastructure and social institution in the 
case of conditions.
Finally, theorizing racial hierarchy as an industrial 
technology preserves the beneits of posthuman 
approaches to racialized humans while avoiding their 
costs. For example, according to our approach, and in 
contrast to the cyborg approach, passing and traveling 
do not alter the biology of racialized persons. According 
to our approach, and in contrast to the prosthetic 
approach, racialized humans do not bear responsibility 
for their oppression; instead, that responsibility rests 
with the conditions that facilitate harmful and oppressive 
impacts—and with those who create or help to sustain 
those conditions. Again, according to our approach, 
but not according to the prosthetic approach, racialized 
humans cannot part from their racial grouping at will: 
they must travel to a time or place with diferent grounds 
for racial hierarchy, thereby changing their race; or 
they must be fortunate enough to pass, beneiting from 
the indeterministic it between racial grouping and 
conditions that facilitate impacts thereof. Finally, our 
approach, unlike other posthuman approaches, draws 
attention to impersonal machinic and social institutions 
responsible for creating, sustaining, and shaping the 
impacts of racial hierarchy.
For these reasons—of empirical it, cross-
disciplinary organization, and theoretical virtue—we 
recommend understanding racial hierarchy within a 
humanistic framework and as an industrial technology. 
Doing so provides a powerful, and largely unexplored, 
critical scheme for scrutinizing the present and 
imagining better futures. It guides us, for example, 
to focus on grounds if we desire to understand better 
where race comes from, but to focus instead on 
conditions if we desire to combat harmful impacts of 
racial hierarchy.
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